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ABSTRACT: CPC99-09
Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of
jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate
commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed "every contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade" and "monopolization" and treated violations as
crimes. By these open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary power to
draw lines between acceptable cooperation and illegal collusion, between vigorous competition and
unlawful monopolization.
By enlisting the courts to elaborate the Sherman Act’ s broad commands, Congress gave
economists a singular opportunity to shape competition policy. Because the statute’ s vital terms
directly implicated economic concepts, their interpretation inevitably would invite contributions from
economists. What emerged is a convergence of economics and law without parallel in public
oversight of business. As economic learning changed, the contours of antitrust doctrine and
enforcement policy eventually would shift, as well.
This article follows the evolution of thinking about competition since 1890 as reflected by major
antitrust decisions and research in industrial organization. We divide the U.S. antitrust experience
into five periods and discuss each period’ s legal trends and economic thinking in three core areas
of antitrust: cartels, cooperation, or other interactions among independent firms; abusive conduct
by dominant firms; and mergers.
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Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence
regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly.  Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the
Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed "every contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade" and "monopolization" and treated violations as crimes. By these
open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary power to draw lines between
acceptable cooperation and illegal collusion, between vigorous competition and unlawful
monopolization.
By enlisting the courts to elaborate the Sherman Act’s broad commands, Congress gave economists
a singular opportunity to shape competition policy.  Because the statute’s vital terms directly
implicated economic concepts, their interpretation inevitably would invite contributions from
economists.  What emerged is a convergence of economics and law without parallel in public
oversight of business.  As economic learning changed, the contours of antitrust doctrine and
enforcement policy eventually would shift, as well.1
This article follows the evolution of thinking about competition since 1890 as reflected by major
antitrust decisions and research in industrial organization.  We divide the U.S. antitrust experience
into five  periods and discuss each period’s legal trends and economic thinking in three core areas of
antitrust: cartels, cooperation, or other interactions among independent firms; abusive conduct by
dominant firms; and mergers.
The Early Days of the Sherman Act: 1890-1914
Most economists in the late 19th century scorned the Sherman Act.2  At best, the statute seemed a
harmless measure incapable of halting an irresistible trend toward firms of larger scale and scope.3
 At worst, the law would impede attainment of superior efficiency promised by new forms of
industrial organization. Few economists lauded the statute as a useful tool for controlling abusive
business conduct.4
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Beyond envisioning large gains from economies of scale and scope, economists at this time actively
debated whether unbridled competition endangered industries with high fixed costs and low marginal
costs, like railroads and utilities. Some argued that government ownership was needed to enable such
industries to recover fixed costs. Others, anticipating Ramsey, Pigou, and Hotelling, recognized that
price discrimination could enable firms to recover fixed costs. Schumpeter’s classic History of
Economic Analysis (1954) reflects the focus of the day. In discussing the 1870-1914 period,
Schumpeter refers not to "industrial organization" but rather to "Railroads, Public Utilities, Trusts,
and Cartels."5
Although the Sherman Act’s first two decades featured no whirlwind of antitrust enforcement, the
courts began shaping the law’s vague terms. The Act’s categorical ban upon "every" contract in
restraint of trade required judges to develop principles for distinguishing between collaboration that
suppressed rivalry and cooperation that promoted growth.  Some early cases, such as United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,6 applied such language literally, yet even these decisions
recognized that prohibiting all agreements which curbed commercial freedom could imperil beneficial
forms of cooperation, such as partnerships.  In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,7 the court
distinguished between "naked" trade restraints, where direct rivals simply agreed to restrict output
and raise price, and reasonable "ancillary" restraints, which encumbered the participants only as much
as needed to expand output or introduce a product that no single participant could offer.  Judges also
rejected arguments that price-fixing by competitors was benign because the cartelists set "reasonable"
prices or desired only to halt an endless downward price spiral (Perelman 1994). 
Early decisions also extended the suspicion of price restrictions to vertical relationships.  In Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons. Co. (1911),8 the Supreme Court held that a minimum resale
price maintenance (RPM)  agreement, by which a manufacturer compels retailers to sell its products
above a specified price, is illegal per se. The rule of Dr. Miles continues to govern such arrangements.
As the courts delineated rules for collusion and cooperation between firms, they struggled in these
early years to come to grips with monopoly. The Sherman Act’s language and legislative history
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indicated that Congress did not condemn the status of monopoly.  Instead, the crucial initial analytical
task for courts was to define the behavior which, when coupled with monopoly power, constituted
illegal monopolization.
At first, the statute provided a feeble check upon the creation and exercise of market dominance.  In
1895 in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,9  the Supreme Court tolerated a series of mergers that gave
the Sugar Trust control over 98 percent of the country’s sugar refining capacity.  The Court found
that the trust’s manufacturing operations did not constitute interstate commerce within the Sherman
Act’s reach.  The E.C. Knight outcome and executive branch indifference to the Sherman Act helped
trigger a merger wave in which such firms as General Electric, International Harvester, du Pont,
Eastman Kodak, U.S. Steel, and Standard Oil achieved preeminence (Stigler 1950: 27).  Not until
1904, when it blocked the combination of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern railroads,10 did
the Supreme Court show that the Sherman Act could forestall mergers to monopoly. 
On the heels of its success in the Northern Pacific matter, the government filed several cases
challenging the nation’s industrial giants.  In Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911),11 the Supreme
Court directly tackled the question of dominant firm conduct and left four enduring marks. First, the
Court treated Standard’s 90 percent share of refinery output as proof of  monopoly.  Future cases
commonly would use high market shares as proxies for monopoly power  Second, the Court
established the "rule of reason" as the basic method of antitrust analysis.  By this standard, judges
would assess conduct on a case-by-case basis, although especially harmful behavior still might be
condemned by bright line, per se rules.  Third, the Court began classifying some behavior as
unreasonably exclusionary.  It ruled that Standard’s selective, below-cost price cuts and buy-outs of
rivals illegally created and maintained the firm’s dominance.  Finally, despite Standard's dire (and
unfulfilled) predictions of industrial apocalypse, the Court broke the firm into 34 parts.
Though Standard Oil is the era’s best known monopolization decision, the Supreme Court imposed
another significant limit upon dominant firms in United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of
St. Louis (1912).12  There the Court forbade various railroads to use their control of terminal facilities
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at the main crossing of the Mississippi River in St. Louis to discriminate against rivals.  In a ruling
with continuing significance for network industries, the Court forced the defendants to give outsiders
access on reasonable terms, observing that the Interstate Commerce Commission could solve the
problem of setting fair access prices.13
Standard Oil ultimately became known as one of the government's finest hours, but Congress did not
view it that way in 1911.  Congress feared that the Supreme Court's apparent softening of the law,
by reading the Sherman Act's ban on "every" trade restraint to bar only "unreasonable" restraints,
foreshadowed continuing efforts by conservative judges to narrow the statute unduly.  This concern
inspired enactment in 1914 of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.  The Clayton
Act reduced judicial discretion by specifically prohibiting certain tying arrangements, exclusive dealing
agreements, interlocking directorates, and mergers achieved by purchasing stock.  The FTC Act
ended the executive branch’s public enforcement monopoly by forming an administrative body to
make antitrust policy.
Ascent of the Rule of Reason: 1915-1936
Following the Standard Oil and Terminal Railroad decisions, the passage of the Clayton Act, and the
creation of the FTC, it might seem that antitrust enforcement was about to step into high gear. 
Instead the antitrust system entered a period of relative repose.14  From 1915 until the mid-1930s, the
courts relied heavily on reasonableness tests to evaluate business conduct and often treated suspect
behavior permissively.  In the same era, the executive branch discouraged aggressive prosecution by
the Justice Department and the FTC.
The shift in emphasis had several sources.  The first was ascent of the  "associationalist" vision of
business-government relations.  Experience with the War Industries Board in World War I led many
economists, business leaders, and government officials to believe that the business-government
collaboration that guided the wartime mobilization provided the best way to organize the economy
in times of peace.  The associationalists received strong support from Herbert Hoover who, as
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Secretary of Commerce and as President, urged businesses to cooperate through trade associations
to exchange information and curb the wasteful features of competition.15
To many observers, the economic collapse in 1929 repudiated the competitive model of economic
organization and verified the associationalist preference that the government take stronger steps to
orchestrate commerce. Advocates of close coordination between government and industry exercised
considerable influence in designing the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and other planning
experiments of the early New Deal.16  By mid-decade, Congress imposed comprehensive controls on
entry and pricing in sectors such as transportation and passed the Robinson-Patman Act (1936),
which sought to prevent national retailing chains from expanding at the expense of small stores. As
support for competition waned, antitrust policy receded as well.
Supreme Court decisions in this era affecting collusion and cooperation between firms reflected
tolerant treatment. With regard to relations among competitors, the Court in Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago v. United States (1918)17 upheld limits that a commodities exchange placed on prices
for after-hours trading.  The Court said the restraints should be evaluated through a comprehensive
inquiry into their history, purpose, and effect.  This multi-factored rule of reason might make analysis
more accurate, but such an approach could require costly, time-consuming efforts to gather and
evaluate information -- conditions that tended to favor defendants. For practices affecting distribution
to downstream firms, the Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Co. (1919)18 permitted
producers to announce a favored distribution policy and "unilaterally" refuse to deal with downstream
firms that did not comply, thus narrowing the Dr. Miles per se ban upon minimum RPM.
In Maple Flooring Manufacturers’ Association v. United States (1925) the Court also took a benign
view of arrangements for sharing price and output data among rivals.19   Maple Flooring holds special
interest for economists today  because it featured the Supreme Court’s first citation to an economist’s
work in an antitrust decision -- in this instance, to underscore how access to information might enable
producers to make efficient output and pricing decisions. Maple Flooring’s author was Harlan Fiske
Stone, a former dean of Columbia Law School, who favored using social science literature to resolve
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legal issues. 
Despite a largely tolerant attitude toward cooperation between firms, Stone and his Supreme Court
colleagues in the 1920s still indicated that some forms of collaboration deserved summary
condemnation.  In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. (1927),20 the Court suggested that
unadorned agreements by competitors to set prices were generally so pernicious that courts might
flatly prohibit them, even though using an elaborate rule of reason might validate such arrangements
in rare cases.  Trenton Potteries appeared to reject Chicago Board of Trade‘s notion that all
agreements among competitors deserved expansive, fact-intensive review.
By the early 1930s, in the depths of the Depression, even the Court’s  stand against naked horizontal
output restrictions wavered. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States (1933),21 the Court refused
to condemn an output restriction scheme embodied in a joint marketing agreement proposed by coal
producers in the eastern U.S.  Like the Congress at the time, the Court appeared to have lost faith
in free market competition and welcomed experiments with sector-wide private ordering.
Appalachian Coals later came to be seen as a Depression-era aberration.
Along with loose rules on cooperation between rivals, the 1915-1936 era marks the longest lapse for
antitrust controls on dominant firm behavior.  Although the courts ordered noteworthy divestitures
in some monopolization cases in the late 1910s, decisions exculpating large defendants were the
norm. In United States v. United States Steel Corp. (1920),22 the Supreme Court slighted evidence
of outright collusion and exonerated the nation's leading steel producer on monopolization charges.
 The Court credited testimony by U.S. Steel's rivals, who praised the defendant’s willingness to let
them prosper beneath its generous price umbrella.  The company's declining market share -- from over
80 percent in 1910 to about 40 percent in 1920 -- also convinced that Court that it lacked market
power.23  U.S. Steel also exposed the Sherman Act’s frailty as a merger control device by revealing
that firms could consolidate a great deal before courts would find illegal monopolization.
When the Supreme Court confronted cases involving market power measurement, it tended to accept
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broad market definitions that made a finding of dominance less likely. In Standard Oil Co. v. United
States (1931),24 the Court upheld a patent pool by which several major refiners set the royalties to
be paid for exploiting catalytic cracking technology.  Key to the decision was the definition of the
relevant market.  If cracking technology were the relevant product, the refiner’ market share would
exceed 60 percent.  Alternatively, if the relevant product encompassed all refining capacity, including
older distillation technology, the defendants’ share would be only 26 percent. The Court embraced
the second alternative and concluded that the refiners probably lacked power to raise prices.   
The FTC found itself by turns unwilling and unable to contribute much to antitrust enforcement. True,
Section 5 of the FTC Act broadly prohibited unfair methods of competition. But the early FTC
suffered from dismal appointments and bumptious leadership -- Louis Brandeis, the FTC Act’s chief
author, called the agency's early commissioners ‘a stupid administration.’25  In one decision after
another, the courts in the 1920s narrowly interpreted the agency's expansive substantive mandate and
information gathering powers. Especially damaging was Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman
Kodak Co. (1927),26 where the Supreme Court said the FTC lacked power under Section 5 to order
divestiture to undo anti-competitive asset acquisitions.  Had the FTC prevailed, it might have become
the government’s premiere merger enforcement agency. Not until the late 1960s did the FTC gain
judicial rulings that repaired the damage from the 1920s.27
It is difficult during this period to detect significant direct effects of economic thinking and research
on judicial antitrust decisions. The courts emphasized market share as an indicator of market power,
while economists focused more upon the beauty of scale economies and their implications for prices
and market structure. While Pigou's writings on price discrimination have proven durable, they
provided no basis for the  prohibitions on price discrimination in the Robinson-Patman Act.  Nor does
the notion of efficient price discrimination by a monopolist to recover fixed costs (that is, Ramsey
pricing) appear in the cases of this era.  Economists of this time were also grappling with the general
problem of how to develop a theory of increasing returns together with monopolistic competition
(Chamberlin, 1933 [containing work dating as early as 1921]; Robinson, 1933). Only much later, in
cases involving mergers of firms with branded products, does this thinking about product
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differentiation enter the legal mainstream.
Emphasis on Market Structure and Per Se Rules: 1936-1972
By the mid-1930s, the economic planning models that inspired great hope early in the New Deal had
lost their luster.  Franklin Roosevelt turned his ear toward advisors who believed the key to economic
restoration was competition.28  From 1936 through 1940, Roosevelt's top appointees to the Justice
Department, culminating with Thurman Arnold’s selection to head the Antitrust Division, mounted
ambitious attacks on horizontal collusion and single-firm dominance.
The trustbusting revival drew intellectual strength from the work of University of Chicago economists
Henry Simons, Jacob Viner, and Frank Knight.29  Simons in particular assailed the statist assumptions
of New Deal planning experiments such as the NIRA and advocated robust antitrust enforcement,
including steps to deconcentrate American industry.30  Here we see champions of free markets
promoting antitrust and competition as preferable to government regulation, planning, or ownership.31
The invigoration of antitrust enforcement in the late 1930s reflected both a heightened suspicion of
corporate gigantism and a search for ways to simplify the government's burden of proof.  Because
the rule of reason formulated in cases such as Chicago Board of Trade often entailed an indeterminate
inquiry that exonerated defendants, many commentators urged courts to simplify the plaintiff’s burden
of proof.
Several Supreme Court decisions accomplished these shifts in policy and abandoned the philosophy
of Appalachian Coals (1933). In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940),32 the Court
condemned collective efforts by refiners to buy "distress" gasoline produced by independents. The
Court emphasized that horizontal price fixing agreements would be condemned summarily and treated
as crimes, regardless of their actual effects.  The Court warned that business managers who tried
privately to recreate the planning schemes that government officials previously had approved acted
at their peril.  In hindsight, Socony’s ban upon all arrangements that affect price seems extreme, but
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its aim in 1940 was to reaffirm the primacy of competition and revitalize the Sherman Act.  In Socony
and  in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (1939), which found an illegal horizontal conspiracy
based on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court showed that unlawful agreements could be
proven without direct evidence such as a participant’s testimony and that such arrangements, if
detected, could be punished severely.
The revival of enforcement against price fixing and market allocation cartels refocused attention on
antitrust’s definition of "agreement."  After toying with the possibility of treating oligopolistic
interdependence as a form of agreement, the Supreme Court in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distributing Corp. (1954)33 ruled that proof of "conscious parallelism," without
more, could not sustain a finding that the defendants acted jointly, and thus could not establish an
antitrust violation. In the years to follow, litigants and courts would spend vast resources to identify
the "plus factors" which, when added to proof of conscious parallelism, would permit a jury to infer
an illegal agreement.
The use of per se tests to condemn conduct extended well beyond the price-setting behavior at issue
in Socony and Interstate Circuit.  In this era, the Supreme Court used per se rules to ban tying
arrangements that conditioned the sale of one product upon the buyer’s agreement to purchase a
second product;34 non-price vertical restraints by which a manufacturer limited its retailers to specific
geographic areas;35 group boycotts by which a full-service retailer threatened not to deal with
manufacturers who sold to discounters;36 and horizontal agreements to allocate markets or
customers.37  The Court also characterized the adoption of exclusive sales territories by participants
in a marketing joint venture as per se unlawful.38
As the courts tightened rules for collusion and cooperation between firms, they also grew more
willing to find that dominant firms had acted improperly. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (1945),39 the court treated the fulfillment of new demand through the preemptive addition
of capacity as wrongful.  In United States v. United Shoe Machinery (1954),40 the court praised the
defendant’s R&D record and noted how its customers approved its policy of only leasing (and not
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selling) its machines, yet still condemned this practice.  In Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.
(1967),41 the Supreme Court condemned a national bakery’s use of localized price cuts to challenge
the leading local producer.  Courts routinely slighted efficiency rationales for challenged behavior,
revealing an implicit suspicion that superior performance never could explain dominance. Few
decisions of this era command praise today.42
In the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Congress bolstered merger control by banning asset or stock
consolidations which fell short of creating dominance.  This measure enabled the government to press
aggressive attacks against categories of horizontal and vertical transactions that previously had
withstood judicial scrutiny.  In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (1962),43 perhaps the most famous
case under the 1950 Act, the Supreme Court invalidated a merger that would have yielded a
horizontal market share of 5 percent and generated a vertical foreclosure of under 2 percent.  Brown
Shoe ruled that the parties’ market share, though low overall, could be deemed excessive in certain
"submarkets." The Court also held that non-efficiency goals, such as preserving small firms, were
relevant to applying the statute.
In 1963 in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,44 the Court allowed the government to
establish a prima facie case of illegality by proving an untoward increase in concentration.  The Court
cautioned that market share data alone was not decisive and the government's prima facie case was
rebuttable. In practice, however, market shares routinely determined outcomes.  Later cases such as
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co. (1966)45 and United States v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1966)46 placed
horizontal mergers creating market shares as low as 4.5 percent at risk.  Rebuttal efforts usually
failed.  Among other arguments, the Supreme Court held efficiency claims to be, at best, irrelevant
and possibly a factor weighing against approval of the merger.47  By the mid-1960s, business
managers realized that antitrust’s pendulum had swung dramatically away from the permissiveness
of the 1920s and early 1930s. In a famous dissent in Von’s Grocery, Justice Potter Stewart captured
the spirit of the time by lamenting that the sole consistency he could perceive in Supreme Court
merger decisions was that "the Government always wins."48  Most commentators today share
Stewart’s gloomy assessment of merger jurisprudence in the 1960s and view the Supreme Court’s
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antipathy toward mergers and doubts about market forces as indefensible.
There is considerable consistency between judicial decisions and economic thinking during the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s.  Although it is uncertain how and to what extent each perspective influenced the
other, judicial application of economic concepts lagged behind new scholarly developments (Kovacic
1992). Even as courts strove to deal with the many tight-knit industrial oligopolies of the day,
economists came to realize that departures from the perfect competition model are normal, indeed
inevitable, even in "competitive" industries.  This view led economists to articulate vague criteria for
whether a market was "workably" competitive (Clark, 1940; Markham, 1950). As judges grappled
with how to treat parallel conduct in tight oligopolies without explicit evidence of collusion,
economists were exploring the pricing behavior of oligopolists, including "price leadership," where
a single large firm initiates price changes and others typically follow (Stigler, 1947; Fellner, 1949;
Markham, 1951). This work showed how price leadership could explain pricing patterns observed
in tight-knit oligopolies, but it gave judges no simple formula for setting clear rules to distinguish
illegal agreements from mere conscious parallelism that could yield similar outcomes.49 
As courts in this era were emphasizing measures of market structure and concentration, industrial
organization thinking focused on articulating and developing the "structure, conduct, performance"
paradigm often associated with the work of Joe Bain (1956; see also Mason, 1939). This framework
encouraged empirical researchers to seek relationships between market concentration and
performance measures such as price/cost margins.50  Despite an emphasis on market concentration
in making this assessment, economists of this time recognized that an industry's long run performance
is likely to hinge more on its level of innovation than on the four-firm concentration ratio or
departures of prices from marginal cost.  Finally, both the courts and economists of this time tended
to downplay efficiencies associated with large-scale enterprises.
The Ascent of the Chicago School: 1973-1991
By the early 1970s, the extreme activism in antitrust law, reflected in public enforcement policy and
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Supreme Court decisions, had attracted harsh criticism from commentators known as the Chicago
School, including legal scholars such as Robert Bork and Richard Posner.  This was not the first time
that the University of Chicago had influenced competition policy.  In the 1930s, Chicago-based
theorists such as Henry Simons played a key role in attacking central planning and promoting
deconcentration policies.  The new Chicago School originated in the work of Aaron Director in the
late 1940s and early 1950s.51  Like Simons, the new Chicago School abhorred comprehensive
regulation of entry and prices.  Unlike their predecessors, the new Chicago scholars emphasized
efficiency explanations for many phenomena, including industrial concentration, mergers, and
contractual restraints, that antitrust law acutely disfavored in the 1950s and 1960s.
Economically astute attorneys such as Bork, Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Ernest Gellhorn and
legally sophisticated economists such as Betty Bock took new Chicago School analytical precepts
and translated them into operational principles that judges readily could apply.52  These commentators
questioned many rules of per se illegality that the Supreme Court created from 1940 to 1972 and
argued that some conduct, such as vertical restraints, was so  often benign or pro-competitive that
courts should uphold it with rules of per se legality. 
By the mid-1970s, the perspectives of these and like-minded commentators increasingly gained
judicial approval.  At least two key factors accounted for this receptivity.  The first was a change in
judicial appointments.  Many of Richard Nixon's appointees to the Supreme Court (most notably on
antitrust issues, Lewis Powell) and the lower courts had comparatively narrow preferences for
antitrust intervention.  The second factor was a sense that U.S. firms were losing ground in
international markets and surrendering market share at home. This perception increased sensitivity
to efficiency arguments.
Litigation over vertical restraints provided the occasion for Chicago School efficiency perspectives
to enter antitrust’s doctrinal mainstream.  The pivotal event was the Supreme Court’s decision in
Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. (1977),53 which held that all non-price vertical restrictions
-- like the location clauses challenged in this case -- warrant rule of reason analysis.  The Court
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prominently cited Chicago School commentary and emphasized that the analysis of economic effects
provided the proper basis for evaluating conduct under the antitrust laws.  Minimum retail price
maintenance agreements remained illegal per se, but later decisions toughened  evidentiary tests for
proving the existence of such arrangements.54
Supreme Court decisions of this period concerning rules for collusion and cooperation by firms reflect
tension between cases favoring the absolutist approach of Socony (1940) -- such as Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society (1982)55 and Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association (1990)56 -- and those endorsing a fuller rule of reason analysis, such as
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (1979)57 and NCAA v. Board of
Regents (1984).58  Although the Court has not reconciled this tension, most of its decisions in this
period perceived the need for an analytical middle ground between per se condemnation and elaborate
rule of reason analysis.59 
During this period, the Justice Department and the FTC brought numerous cases challenging
dominant firm conduct. With rare, noteworthy exceptions such as United States v. AT&T Co.
(1982),60 which broke up the Bell system, these cases usually failed (Kovacic, 1989: 1106-09). For
the most part, the courts gave dominant firms considerable freedom to choose pricing,61 product
development,62 and promotional strategies.63
A more permissive climate developed for mergers, as well. In United States v. General Dynamics
Corp. (1974),64 the government suffered its first Supreme Court defeat under the Celler-Kefauver
Act.  General Dynamics showed that the rebuttal possibilities recognized in Philadelphia National
Bank (1963) were not illusory.  Several influential lower court cases used ease of entry to permit
mergers that yielded high market shares.65 Other decisions recognized at least the conceptual validity
of efficiency justifications.66  Perhaps most important, the court of appeals in United States v. Baker
Hughes, Inc. (1990),67 with a panel including future Supreme Court justices Clarence Thomas and
Ruth Ginsburg, ruled that the defendant's burden of proof in a merger case depends on whether the
plaintiff relies solely on market share data or provides further evidence of likely anti-competitive
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effects.  These decisions parallel similar developments in the federal merger guidelines, which
disavowed the most extreme enforcement possibilities created by Supreme Court merger decisions
in the 1960s.68
During this era, it is clear that the courts, under the Chicago School’s influence, were trimming back
antitrust doctrine. Yet the same analytical tools that economists used to challenge interventionist
antitrust doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s, by showing that certain practices often could increase
efficiency and boost competitiveness, were simultaneously offering new methods for arguing that
many business practices sometimes could harm competition.
One prominent example of this dynamic occurred in the area of "predatory pricing," in which a firm
temporarily sells below cost to subdue rivals and then collects monopoly rents. While economists for
decades had criticized many predatory pricing cases, government enforcers remained keen on these
matters through the 1970s. But the courts in the 1970s paid careful attention to the economic
literature, to the extent that the term "average variable cost" now commonly appears in predatory
pricing decisions (American Bar Association, 1997: 253-66). By the mid-1980s, in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986),69 the Supreme Court was saying that predatory
pricing rarely made business sense, because the predator had little probability of sustaining a future
monopoly long enough to recoup losses incurred through below-cost sales.  Yet at the same time,
game theorists were showing how predation could rationally occur in a world with imperfect
information and signaling, if potential entrants had long memories and declined to challenge a deep-
pocket incumbent who had displayed a willingness to respond to entry by selling below cost.
Game-theoretic methods dominated industrial organization theory in the 1970s and 1980s. The
flexibility of game theory allowed economic theorists to generate equilibrium predictions in settings
involving a wide range of conduct, from R&D decisions to advertising to product positioning, as well
as the classic problem of oligopolistic pricing.  However, the same flexibility made general predictions
hard to come by.70   Some conduct, such as long-term contracts with key customers or preemptive
capacity expansion, could deter entry and entrench dominance, but they also could generate
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efficiencies.  The only way to tell in a given case appeared to be for the antitrust agencies and the
courts to conduct a full-scale rule-of-reason inquiry.
Towards a Post-Chicago Synthesis: Since 1992
Antitrust decisions and government enforcement policy since the mid-1990s have begun to reflect the
flexibility of recent analytical perspectives.71  The most noteworthy feature of recent cases concerning
collusion or cooperation between firms is the search for manageable analytical techniques that avoid
the complexity of the traditional rule of reason yet supply a richer factual analysis than per se tests.
In California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission (1999),72 the Supreme Court
acknowledges the conceptual validity of analytical models lying between the per se and full-fledged
rule of reason poles, but does not specify how to structure such inquiries.  Further development of
such methodologies may occur in the Justice Department’s recent challenge to the membership rules
of Visa and MasterCard, which prevent member financial institutions from issuing credit cards that
compete against Visa and MasterCard,73 and in proposed federal guidelines on collaboration among
competitors.74
Government efforts to combat collusion in the 1990s have applied game theory in two notable ways.
 First, the Justice Department adopted a policy that gives criminal immunity to the first cartel member
to reveal the cartel’s existence.75  Recent criminal enforcement results indicate that the strategy elicits
valuable information. In 1999, using data supplied by a cartel member under the new policy, the
Justice Department obtained guilty pleas from BASF and Roche to pay a total of $750 million in
criminal fines (an amount surpassing the sum of all Sherman Act criminal fines since 1890) for fixing
vitamin prices.76  Second, the government has prosecuted behavior that facilitates coordination, not
just the coordination itself.  For example, in the early 1990s, the government obtained a settlement
from several airlines to bar the use of computer reservation systems to coordinate prices.77  As the
Internet emerges as a key conduit for commerce, we will see more enforcement actions and judicial
decisions on how firms may interact in cyberspace (Baker 1996).
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Perhaps the most important modern judicial use of game theory, the economics of information, and
transaction-cost economics is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.78 Kodak was
accused of monopolizing a market consisting of parts and service for its own photocopiers.  A lower
court granted summary judgment for Kodak, which argued that its 20 percent share of sales of new
copiers made it irrational to impose unreasonable aftermarket restraints on its installed base.  The
court of appeals overturned the grant of summary judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The
Court extensively cited game-theoretic commentary, much as it had quoted Chicago School scholars
in Sylvania (1977). Relying heavily on notions such as imperfect information and lock-in as sources
of market power, the Court said a trial was necessary to assess Kodak’s ability to exploit its installed
base and evaluate its business justifications.79
At first it seemed that Kodak might transform jurisprudence governing dominant firm conduct, and
this may still prove possible. Since 1992, however, lower court decisions have tended to limit Kodak's
application to a relatively demanding set of conditions. Moreover, the possibility that Kodak heralded
a major expansion of antitrust liability weakened after Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. (1993).80  There the Supreme Court established the formidable requirement that
predatory pricing plaintiffs prove that the defendant is likely to recoup its investment in below-cost
sales once the plaintiff has exited.  In a recent lawsuit that alleges predatory pricing by American
Airlines, the Justice Department is using game theory concepts to show that recoupment is likely.81
In general, merger analysis has become more heavily economic. Economic concepts pervade the
federal merger guidelines, and merger analysis, whether performed by prospective merger partners
or antitrust agencies, routinely involves close collaboration between economists and attorneys.
Although the Supreme Court has said nothing about substantive merger rules since 1975,82 lower
court decisions and government enforcement guidelines continue to deviate from standards the Court
endorsed in the 1960s.  These developments have both toughened and loosened antitrust
enforcement. Some cases, such as the rejection of the Staples/Home Depot merger (1997),83 have
analyzed competitive effects in seemingly narrow submarkets and have used electronic data from cash
registers to measure market power directly by analyzing how the business at one chain  affected the
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other. However, in 1997, the federal agencies amended their merger guidelines to account more
generously for merger synergies in analyzing competitive effects.  This approach could make the law
more friendly to mergers in some cases.
In recent years, antitrust enforcement has increasingly focused on innovation issues, as suggested by
the release in 1995 of federal guidelines for licensing intellectual property.84  The recent concern with
innovation may seem a slow reaction to Schumpeter's (1942) observation decades ago that innovation
is the prime determinant of economic performance and growth.  But modern policy reflects more
recent work by economists showing how technology spurs growth, the role of patents in promoting
or perhaps retarding innovation, and the impact of licensing.  The FTC's recent suit against Intel for
 withdrawing cooperation from its microchip customers85 involved a highly innovative industry that
relies heavily on cross licensing.  In the Justice Department’s battle against Microsoft,86 both parties
depict themselves as  champions of innovation. The government’s theory in Microsoft draws
extensively from game theory involving strategic entry deterrence and raising rivals costs.
For the future, two related challenges confront the 1990s approach to antitrust enforcement, capable
as it is of generating various results.  One is for economists and attorneys to devise analytical
techniques that accurately identify complex business practices as being pro-competitive or anti-
competitive.  The second is to adapt such techniques to formulate rules that are suited to the
capabilities of enforcement agencies and courts and give the business community stable, predictable
bases for designing business plans.  Recent prosecutions such as the abuse of dominance cases against
American Airlines and Microsoft place a premium on the ability of the antitrust system to do both of
these things.
Conclusions
The Sherman Act and its offshoots, as applied through the twists and turns of doctrine and
enforcement in the 20th century, have attained almost constitutional stature in America.87  No other
country has adopted an antitrust statute that contains equally broad substantive provisions and relies
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so heavily on a common law method of judicial interpretation to implement them.  The consciously
evolutionary quality of the U.S. antitrust statutes, with their implicit recognition of the need to adjust
doctrine over time in light of experience and new learning, gives economists considerable power to
influence competition law and policy.
Economists have made two major contributions to the U.S. antitrust regime.  The first is to make the
case for competition as the superior mechanism for governing the economy.  Throughout the 20th
century, America’s antitrust laws have coexisted uneasily with policies that favor extensive
government intervention in the economy through planning, ownership, or sweeping controls over
prices and entry. Economists have informed the debate about the  relative merits of competition by
illuminating the costs of measures that suppress rivalry with the ostensible aim of serving the public
interest.
The second significant contribution of economists has been to guide the formation of antitrust policy.
 Economic learning has exerted an increasing impact on antitrust enforcement.  In the first half of the
20th century, one finds little direct impact of economic research on the major court cases. The
influence increases in the century’s second half, but usually with a lag.  Today, the links between
economics and law have been institutionalized with increasing presence of an economic perspective
in law schools, extensive and explicit judicial reliance on economic theory, and with the substantial
presence of economists in the government antitrust agencies. The availability of new data sources like
electronic point-of-purchase data, the refinement of flexible game-theoretic models, and the new
emphasis on innovation assures that robust arguments over the proper content of competition policy
will flourish into the 21st century.
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